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Abstract 
By enacting, for example, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896) and the Uniform 
Sales Law (1906) the American states unified and codified parts of the American Common Law. 
In the main, both Uniform Laws followed British models. Is this to imply that the American 
states, at the time, preferred British commercial law to any other commercial law? If only because 
Uniform  Commercial  Code  (1958)  Article  2  on  Sales  and  Article  3  on  Commercial  Papers 
diverged from British models, the answer is not self-evident. This paper shows that Britain’s 
economic leverage with the United States, which was to last until the First World War, must have 
influenced developments pertaining to the American Common Law. (JEL: K 00, N 00) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The ‘Americanization’ of the (Common) Law in the United States over the course of the 
nineteenth  century  has  been  well-documented.  However,  two  important  developments 
pertaining to the American Common Law have thus far received only scant attention. 
Louisiana State did not adopt the French Commercial Code. In fact, the commercial law 
of the State of Louisiana has always largely been in step with the (British) commercial 
law of the sister states. Is this to imply that the State of Louisiana, at the time, preferred 
British commercial law to any other commercial law? If only because Louisiana State 
adopted  in  large  part  the  French  Civil  Code,  the  answer  to  this  question  is  not  self-
evident. A similar question can be derived from the following legislative development. 
All American states, including Louisiana, enacted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Law (1896). This Uniform Law was part of a successful project to reduce to writing 
branches of the American Common Law. Yet, in spite of the ‘Americanization’ of the   2 
Common Law, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896) and the Uniform Sales 
Law (1906) copied substantial parts of the (British) Bills of Exchange Act (1882) and 
Sale of Goods Act (1893), for example. Is this to imply that the American states, at the 
time, preferred British commercial law to any other commercial law? If only because 
Uniform  Commercial  Code  (1958)  Article  2  on  Sales  and  Article  3  on  Commercial 
Papers  diverged  from  British  models,  the  answer  to  this  question  is  not  self-evident. 
Through an investigation of the extent to which economic interdependencies between the 
various American states might have influenced developments concerning the American 
Common Law, this paper purports to answer the two research questions. As Louisiana’s 
economic dependence upon Northeastern States became larger than the other way around, 
it seems that the State must have had little interest in implementing commercial law that 
bore no resemblance to the British-oriented commercial law of the Northeastern States, in 
particular. By the same token, as the economic dependence of the United States as a 
whole  upon  Britain  was  still  stronger  than  vice  versa  at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  American  states  must  have  had  an  interest  in  restoring  unity  in  their 
commercial laws along British lines. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The ensuing section offers a general framework in which 
to think about the interplay between economic interdependencies between jurisdictions 
and  developments  regarding  the  common  law  in  these  jurisdictions.  The  subsequent 
Sections  III  to  VIII  survey  developments  pertaining  to  the  American  Common  Law. 
Section III inquires into the reasons for Louisiana State to reject the Code de Commerce 
(1808), while the Louisiana Civil Code largely followed the Code de Napoléon (1807). 
Section IV is concerned with the fragmentation of the American Common Law into the 
Common Laws of the various American states in the course of the nineteenth century. 
The  failure  of  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  to  restore  the  relative  unity  in  the American 
Common  Law  is  the  topic  of  Section  V.  The  issue  of  why  uniform  laws  governing 
commercial transactions, such as, for example, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law 
(1896) and the Uniform Sales Law (1906) followed in large measure British models is 
explored in Section VI. Section VII consists of a discussion of why Uniform Commercial   3 
Code (1958) Article 2 on Sales and Article 3 on Commercial Papers, that were submitted 
to replace the two Uniform Laws, departed from their British counterparts. The subject of 
Section  VIII  is  the  substantial  influence  the  State  of  New  York  enjoyed  over  the 
production  of  the  Uniform  Commercial  Code  (1958).  Last  but  not  least,  Section  IX 
arrives at a tentative conclusion. 
 
 
II.  Framework of Analysis 
 
Jurisdictions may have ‘divergent’ (common) law. From a theoretical angle, this section 
sheds light on the issue of whether a jurisdiction may have an interest in switching to or 
retaining legal rules that are not most preferred by this jurisdiction. The term ‘divergent’ 
is defined in the following way. Legal rules should ensure that citizens who want to 
engage in economic activity are able to do so. After all, economic activity can leave 
everybody  involved  better  off.  Legal  rules  do  more  than  simply  facilitate  economic 
activity,  however.  They  also  may  affect  the  way  citizens  divide  potential  gains  from 
economic  activity  (see  e.g.  Baird  1994:  219).  That  is,  to  facilitate  economic  activity 
equally well, the common law as applied in separate jurisdictions need not affect the 
division  of  potential  gains  from  economic  activity  in  any  particular  way.
1  Stated 
otherwise, the common law as applied in separate jurisdictions that facilitates economic 
activity equally well can still differ in its distributional consequences. It follows that, to 
understand processes of unifying and codifying divergent common law, an investigation 
of whether or not separate jurisdictions, constrained by economic rivalry, will succeed in 
providing common law that facilitates economic activity does not suffice. The latter issue 
                                                 
1The  potential  gains  to  be  derived  from  a  given  economic  activity  are,  say, 
maximally  ¼ :KHQ WKH FRPPRQ ODZ DV DSSOLHG LQ VHSDUDWH MXULVGLFWLRQV LV  able  to 
facilitate the said economic activity so as to create potential gains of ¼LQWKHDJJUHJDWH
the common law of separate jurisdictions facilitates economic activity equally well. From 
this angle of perspective, common law that is able to facilitate the said economic activity 
so as to create potential gains of only  ¼ LQ WKH DJJUHJDWH IDFLOLWDWHV HFRQRPLF DFWLYLW\
less well.   4 
has received considerable scholarly attention (see e.g. La Porta et al. 2004; Mahoney 
2001; Wagner 1998 and references therein). 
If indeed the common law as applied in separate jurisdictions affects differently 
the way their citizens divide potential gains from economic activity, citizens of separate 
jurisdictions presumably prefer the way their own common law affects the division of 
potential gains from economic activity. Presumably, as neither a switch of a jurisdiction 
to different common law nor a move of a citizen to another jurisdiction is costless. Even 
ignoring this, by acting strictly on their own, without considering any opportunities for 
coordination, it is far from obvious that separate jurisdictions will succeed independently 
in supplying common law that affects identically the way citizens divide potential gains 
from economic activity. Clearly, in case the operative body of common law in separate 
jurisdictions  differs  in  its  distributional  consequences,  citizens  engaged  in  inter-
jurisdictional  economic  activity  have  conflicting  interests  regarding  the  applicable 
common  law.  Failure  to  agree  on  the  applicable  common  law  may  prevent  mutually 
beneficial economic activity from taking place. 
  A uniform law solves the coordination problem as faced by citizens engaged in 
inter-jurisdictional economic activity. Then, the answer to the question of whether or not 
to  unify  and  codify  a  part  of  the  common  law  comprises  two  halves.  For  example, 
movements for codification of divergent family law may perhaps draw little support from 
jurisdictions,  not  so  much  because  of  the  distributional  consequences  of  regionally 
defined family law, but, rather, because the number of inter-jurisdictional family affairs is 
relatively limited. By contrast, in spite of possibly large distributional consequences of, 
for  example,  regionally  defined  commercial  law,  initiatives  to  codify  this  part  of  the 
common law may nonetheless resonate well with jurisdictions. For example, Larry E. 
Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi recognize that uniform laws providing default rules for 
commercial  transactions  can  play  a  part  in  facilitating  inter-jurisdictional  economic 
activity  (1996:  150).  The  volume  compounded  by  the  value  of  inter-jurisdictional 
commercial  transactions  might  fuel  calls  for  unification  of  the  commercial  law. 
Unfortunately, no empirical study will be able to provide the detailed information as is 
required to state with any degree of precision when exactly unification and codification   5 
of  the  common  law  becomes  essential  to  facilitating  an  ever-growing  economic 
interdependence  between  separate  jurisdictions.  Before  taking  on  the  challenge  of 
unifying divergent common law, separate jurisdictions might first settle on enacting a 
uniform law on conflict of laws. Conflict of laws rules are rules of a jurisdiction that 
determine whether domestic law or foreign law applies to an inter-jurisdictional legal 
problem. 
  To  be  sure,  the  supposition  made  in  the  paper  is  that  the  legal  rules  of  all 
jurisdictions facilitate economic activity equally well, but, at the same time, differ in their 
distributional consequences. To suppose otherwise would basically be to deny the need 
for jurisdictions to coordinate their actions so as to craft uniform laws. For jurisdictions 
that hold the same opinion about the way in which their legal rules ought to affect the 
division of gains from economic activity might independently succeed in providing legal 
rules that facilitate economic activity equally well. Instead, the ability of jurisdictions to 
foster economic growth is exogenous to our analysis. Then, the issue is whether or not 
the American states sought to place the legal rules into uniform laws of the American 
state or third country that was strongest able to engender economic growth. In doing so, 
other  federal  states  might  have  propelled  their  own  economic  growth  by  spurring 
economic activity with this American state or third country. That is, an existing economic 
dependence upon a particular jurisdiction might induce other jurisdictions to place the 
legal  rules  into  uniform  laws  of  this  jurisdiction. And  in  placing  the  legal  rules  into 
uniform  laws  of  a  particular  jurisdiction,  other  jurisdictions  might  accelerate  their 
economic activity with this jurisdiction. Unfortunately, any empirical study will fall short 
of providing the detailed information as is required to quantify the projected increase in 
inter-jurisdictional  economic  activity.  There  is  no  alternative  but  to  blend  together 
information  about  economic  interdependencies  between  separate  jurisdictions  and 
developments regarding regionally defined (common) law. Theoretical reasoning makes 
clear that, although the divergent (common) law of separate jurisdictions may facilitate 
economic activity equally well, separate jurisdictions may have an interest in introducing 
the legal rules of a particular jurisdiction into uniform laws rather than any other legal 
rules. The point is that this particular jurisdiction may strongest be able to advance the 
economic growth of all other jurisdictions. It is this theoretical finding against which the   6 
historical  information  on  developments  concerning  the  American  Common  Law  as 
presented in Sections III to VIII will be interpreted. 
 
 
III.  Louisiana Does Not Adopt the French Code de Commerce (1808) 
 
Apart from Louisiana, all federal states of the newly established United States embraced 
the common-law system as applied in the thirteen original North American colonies of 
Britain. When the United States took possession of Louisiana on December 20
th 1803, 
Roman, Spanish and French law had been operative in this French territory for years. It is 
therefore no surprise that the early Louisiana Civil Codes followed largely the Code de 
Napoléon (1807) and drew heavily on French legal doctrine and jurisprudence. Until this 
very day, a Civil Code has been operative in Louisiana. On the other hand, although 
Louisiana  opposed  the  introduction  of  the  common-law  system,  the  French  Code  de 
Commerce (1808) was never placed on a state level for the reason that in the opinion of 
the  Louisiana  Legislature  the  commercial  law  of  the  State  should  not  be  essentially 
different from the commercial law of the sister states (Yiannopoulos 1997: xxvi). 
  A reason involved in the decision of the Louisiana Legislature to reject the Code 
de  Commerce  (1808)  originated  at  least  in  part  from  the  evolving  economic 
interdependence between the federal states of the United States. In the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, the economic interdependence between the three major regions of the 
United States, the East, South and West, became firmly established. Douglass C. North’s 
analysis of this mutual interdependence between the three regions is worth quoting: ‘The 
Northeast provided not only the services to finance, transport, insure, and market the 
South’s cotton, but also supplied the South with manufactured goods, either from its own 
industry or imported and reshipped to the South (1966: 68).’ And North goes on to argue 
that: ‘The consequence, … , was that the expanding income from the marketing of these 
staples outside the region induced little growth within the South. Income received there 
had little local multiplier effect, but flowed directly to the North and the West for imports   7 
of services, manufactures and foodstuffs (1966: 122).’ Of all American states, New York 
became  the  strongest  engine  of  economic  growth  (North  1966:  126).  Then,  with  the 
emergence of economic interdependencies between the federal states of the United States, 
it appears that the introduction of French commercial law could only have undermined 
Louisiana’s economic activity with sister states that used British commercial law as a 
starting point for legal reasoning. 
 
 
IV.  Disunity in the Common Laws of the American States 
 
In  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  United  States  developed  its  own 
manufacturing industries and credit system, accompanied by a large domestic market. 
The growth of foreign trade and commerce of the United States did not keep pace with 
the growth of domestic trade and commerce. With the notable exception of the cotton 
planters  in  the  South,  the  dependence  of  the  United  States  upon  foreign  trade  and 
commerce decreased markedly (see e.g. Lipsey 2000: 690). And with the establishment 
of an American banking system, the relative importance of foreign capital flows declined 
as  well  (see  e.g.  North  1966:  211).  As  domestically  induced  expansion  of  trade  and 
commerce gained in importance relative to prospects for expansion of foreign trade and 
commerce, notably with Britain, the ‘American’ Common Law could veer away from the 
British Common Law. Legal evidence for the emergence of an American Common Law 
is  overwhelming  (see  e.g.  Llewellyn  1989;  Nelson  1994).  As  an  aside,  it  should  be 
observed that statutes as received from Britain were also subject to an Americanization. 
For  example,  with  regard  to  the  United  States  federal  patent  legislation,  Harold  C. 
Wegner remarks that: ‘The war of 1812 helped assure that the patent systems in America 
and England would evolve in independent paths, as they have (1993: 7).’ However, in the 
United States, the constitutional arrangements left law-making authority in commercial-
law matters largely in the hands of the respective States. In the American states the law 
governing  commercial  transactions,  such  as,  for  example,  negotiable  instruments  and   8 
sales law, was generally not covered by statute, but by common law, that is, case law. It 
follows that state courts had been perfectly allowed to develop their own distinct case-
law systems over the years. The resulting fragmentation of the American Common Law 
into the Common Laws of the different States seems due in part to a rise in intrastate 
trade and commerce. Along with the tremendous increase in American interstate trade 
and commerce, intrastate trade and commerce assumed equally huge proportions. For 
instance, around 1840, the demand for Northeastern manufactures remained largest in the 
Northeastern region itself because the Southern and Western regions were less affluent 
than the Northeastern regions (Uselding 1976: 435). 
 
 
V.  U.S. Supreme Court Unable to Reimpose Unity in the American Common Law 
 
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, a root cause for continuous calls for the 
codification of areas of the American Common Law had been to arrest developments 
towards ever-sharper disparities in state laws. For example, from the 1820s onwards, 
Joseph  Story,  among  others,  started  to  appeal  for  the  codification  of  the  American 
Common Law. According to him, the decentralization of the law-making institutions in 
the United States under the federal system was destroying the relative uniformity of the 
common law (see e.g. Cook 1981: 105). Notably in the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
Swift v. Tyson,
2 Justice Story tried to reimpose legal uniformity through case law (see e.g. 
Rheinstein 1973: 139; Mehren 1988: 44). As a general rule, federal courts did have a 
jurisdiction to deal with all cases in which parties were citizens of different states. Under 
the 34
th Section of the Federal Judiciary Act, first enacted in 1789, federal courts had to 
apply the state statutes applicable to such interstate disputes. But, as noted in the previous 
section, in the respective federal states the commercial law was generally not covered by 
statute, but by common law, that is, case law. To surmount this obstacle, Story declared 
that the federal courts did not have to take the case law of the state in question into 
                                                 
2Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).   9 
account. Moreover, Story declared that the federal courts knew by themselves what the 
right rule of the common law was. 
  Certainly, Story’s effort to apply a uniform federal rule to interstate disputes was 
tantamount to a quest for uniformity of commercial law in the United States. Yet, in spite 
of the 1842 Supreme Court ruling, within the confines of the same federal state, the same 
legal problem could still be handled under different rules, depending on whether the case 
would come up in a state or federal court. In practice, the federal version of the common 
law did not find general acceptance with the state courts. Little wonder, then, that federal 
courts could only fail miserably in creating a body of uniform commercial law, finding its 
ultimate expression in decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court (Pound 1938: 154). While 
federal  case  law  was  unable  to  provide  legal  certainty  sufficiently,  conflict  of  laws 
regimes were established to remedy the problem of divergent state laws. To quote Morton 
J. Horwitz: ‘The field of conflicts of laws, then, arose to express the novel view that 
incompatible legal rules could be traced to differing social policies and that the problem 
of resolving legal conflicts could not be solved by assuming the existence of only one 
correct rule from which all deviation represented simple error (1977: 246).’ Meanwhile, 
Restatements  of  the  Law  and  legal  textbooks  were  to  preserve  unity  in  state  laws. 
Restatements of the Law released by the State of New York were highly authoritative 
(see  e.g.  Cook  1981:  167).  Nevertheless,  as  American  interstate  economic  activity 
assumed ever-larger proportions in the course of the nineteenth century, Restatements of 
the  Law  and  legal  textbooks  could  hardly  prevent  state  laws  from  charting  different 
courses. Therefore, throughout the nineteenth century, codification remained a serious 
option in achieving unity in the American Common Law. 
 
 
VI.  Codification of Parts of the American Common Law 
 
It was not until the very close of the nineteenth century that attempts to reduce parts of 
the common law to writing finally bore fruit in the United States. The American Bar   10 
Association, which was organized in 1878, in 1889, installed a Committee on Uniform 
State Laws. Under the leadership of this committee and of the State of New York, the 
National  Conference  of  Commissioners  on  Uniform  State  Laws  (NCCUSL)  was 
organized with the specific purpose of promoting uniformity in state laws. NCCUSL 
sponsored seven uniform laws providing default rules for commercial transactions and 
particularly negotiable instruments and sales law.
3 Interestingly enough, in the United 
States, after several failed initiatives, a successful initiative to unify bankruptcy law on a 
federal level was launched in the same period as well. 
  With regard to the question of why parts of the American Common Law were 
only codified successfully in the late nineteenth century, the following claim of Roscoe 
Pound deserves mention: ‘What Story the judge could not do, Story the text writer largely 
accomplished. More than anything else the books of our great nineteenth century text 
writers defeated the urge for a code which we  were in no condition to frame in our 
formative era. In Louisiana you had the French Civil Code for a solid foundation. But in 
jurisdictions which had inherited English law there was no such foundation. There was 
nothing ripe to be codified. Codification could only come effectively after an era of legal 
maturity which was still well into the future (1938: 154).’ This claim contains more than 
a grain of truth, but should, nevertheless, not mask the fact that the rapid extension of 
interstate economic activity in the United States in the course of the nineteenth century 
seems to have demanded assimilation of (branches of) the American Common Law. It 
should be mentioned aside that the passage of federal bankruptcy legislation in 1898 can 
also be seen against the backdrop of ever-increasing interstate economic activity (Hansen 
1998). The inevitable consequence of the increase in interstate economic activity in the 
United States was an increase in the number of bankruptcies in which creditors and assets 
were located in more than one federal state. 
                                                 
3Namely, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896), Uniform Warehouse 
Receipts Act (1906), Uniform Sales Act (1906), Uniform Bills of Lading Act (1909), 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act (1909), Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1918) and Uniform 
Trust Receipts Act (1933).   11 
  British Statutes received considerable attention from the drafters of the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Law (1896) and the Uniform Sales Law (1906), for example. As 
matters turned out, until well into the twentieth century, the United States as well as other 
English-speaking  countries were  governed by statutes similar to the (British) Bills of 
Exchange Act (1882) and Sale of Goods Act (1893).
4 Of course, it is difficult to see how, 
in enacting uniform commercial laws that bore resemblance to British counterparts, the 
American states could have turned their legal orders in a shambles. Indeed, by 1924, the 
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896) had been enacted by all fifty-two States, 
including Louisiana, albeit with numerous changes (Hudson and Feller 1931: 337). And 
the Uniform Sales Law (1906) was eventually enacted by thirty-seven States, but, for 
example, Louisiana was not among them (see on this issue Section VIII). Moreover, at 
the dawn of the twentieth century, Britain was the single largest foreign investor in and 
single  largest  trading  partner  of  the  United  States  (see  e.g.  Lipsey  2000:  698,  712). 
Actually, Britain was the world’s leading net creditor before the First World War and the 
United States was the world’s largest net debtor. And, until the First World War, Britain 
remained the world’s leading trading partner, with Germany occupying a solid second 
place.  Yet,  on  the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War,  the  United  States  had  already 
surpassed France as the third greatest trading partner of the world. This is to indicate that, 
around 1900, remodeling American commercial law along British lines would still have 
been to strike two birds with one blow for the American states. Unity in the commercial 
law  across  the  United  States  would  be  restored.  And,  simultaneously,  unity  in  the 
commercial law of the United States and its most important economic partner, that is, 
Britain,  would  be  restored.  On  the  other  hand,  in  1958,  the  (American)  Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 2 on Sales and Article 3 on Commercial Papers did break away 
from the British models followed in the original Uniform Laws, for example. As will be 
seen in the next section, the reason for the clear break with British commercial law seems 
                                                 
4See on the production of the (British) Bills of Exchange Act (1882) and Sale of 
Goods Act (1893): Chalmers, McKenzie D. 1886. An Experiment in Codification. Law 
Quarterly  Review  2:  125-134  and  Chalmers,  McKenzie  D.  1903.  Codification  of 
Mercantile Law. Law Quarterly Review 19: 10-18.   12 
to some extent embedded in changed economic relations between Britain and the United 
States after the Second World War. 
 
 
VII.  Uniform Commercial Code (1958) Departs From British Examples 
 
In 1940, NCCUSL adopted a proposal to prepare a (new) Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC). On January 1
st 1945, in cooperation with the American Law Institute,
5 work on 
the project was begun. After a substantial number of drafts and re-drafts the Official Text 
of the Uniform Commercial Code was finalized in 1958.
6 The UCC was divided into nine 
Articles.
7  The  substance  of  the  UCC  seems  to  bear  relationship  to  America’s  world 
leadership after the Second World War. The first half of the twentieth century brought 
considerable changes in the economic relations between Britain and the United States. 
Where Britain’s share in world trade declined in the first half of the twentieth century, 
America’s share grew significantly. Since the Second World War the United States had 
replaced Britain as the world’s largest trading partner. Likewise, since the Second World 
War Britain had not only lost its position as the single largest foreign investor in the 
                                                 
5The American Law Institute, a private law organization, was created in 1923 for 
the  purpose  of  producing  Restatements  of  the  Law  in  order  to  provide  more  legal 
certainty to American Law. 
6On the origins of the UCC see, for example, Uniform Commercial Code for Use 
in  2004:  Official  Text  and  Comments,  The  American  Law  Institute  and  National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 2004 Edition, St. Paul, MN: West 
Publishing Co.. 
7Division  into  nine  articles  and  principal  drafters  were  as  follows:  Article  1. 
General Provisions (Karl N. Llewellyn), Article 2. Sales (Karl N. Llewellyn), Article 3. 
Commercial  Papers  (William  L.  Prosser),  Article  4.  Bank  Deposits  and  Collections 
(Fairfax  Leary,  Jr.),  Article  5.  Letters  of  Credit  (Fredrich  Kessler),  Article  6.  Bulk 
Transfers  (Charles  Bunn),  Article  7.  Warehouse  Receipts,  Bills  of  Lading  and  Other 
Documents  of  Title  (Louis  B.  Schwartz),  Article  8.  Investment  Securities  (Soia 
Mentschikoff),  Article  9.  Secured  Transactions;  Sales  of  Accounts  and  Chattel  Paper 
(Allison Dunham and Grant Gilmore).   13 
United  States,  Britain  itself  had  become  a  net  debtor  to  the  United  States  (see  e.g. 
Eichengreen 2000: 488). This structural change in the economic relations between the 
United States and Britain constituted an event of significance to developments regarding 
the American commercial law. The legal rules provided for in UCC Article 2 on Sales 
and Article 3 on Commercial Papers moved away from British counterparts, for example. 
That is, the preceding Uniform Laws, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896) 
and the Uniform Sales Law (1906), bore a closer resemblance to British models (see e.g. 
Beutel 1951: 557; Williston 1950: 564). As UCC Articles 2 and 3 opened a rift between 
American  and  British  commercial  law,  they  disturbed  or  perhaps  even  destroyed  the 
existing uniformity of commercial law between the Anglo-American systems of law. This 
is to reaffirm that the ever-evolving economic interdependence between Britain and the 
United  States  provides  something  of  a  window  on  developments  pertaining  to  the 
American commercial law. 
 
 
VIII.  ‘Home-Grown’ Legal Rules Included in the Uniform Commercial Code 
 
America’s economic clout on the world stage after the Second World War seems to have 
allowed drafters of the UCC to pay less heed to developments regarding the commercial 
law outside the United States. UCC Article 3 on Commercial Papers could have adopted, 
but, in effect, did not adopt the substance of the Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and 
Promissory Notes (Geneva, 1930) and the Uniform Law Concerning Cheques (Geneva, 
1931). Though the United States has never adopted the said Uniform Laws, they are still 
operative in civil-law countries across the globe. Similarly, UCC Article 2 on Sales could 
have  adopted,  but,  in  effect,  did  not  adopt  the  legal  rules  embodied  in  one  of  the 
numerous preliminary drafts of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (The 
Hague, 1964) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (The Hague, 1964). Much to the chagrin of Western Europe, given their 
limited compatibility with ‘home-grown’ American sales law, the United States declined   14 
to enact the said Uniform Laws. At least partly due to American disinterest in the whole 
venture, the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (The Hague, 1964) and the 
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (The 
Hague, 1964) failed to garner widespread approval. 
  Of all American states, New York exerted influence upon the drafting process of 
the UCC the strongest. Especially the State of New York held the opinion that the UCC, 
as  it  had  been  published  in  1952,  needed  substantial  revision.  Hence,  no  State  but 
Pennsylvania enacted the UCC before 1957 and the Law Revision Commission of New 
York  made  a  substantial  number  of  revisions  on  the  UCC,  which  were  ultimately 
included in the 1958 Official Text (see e.g. MacDonald 1963: 437). In September 1957, 
the State of Massachusetts first enacted this revised draft of the UCC, effective as of 
October 1
st 1958. Before the UCC became effective in the State of New York, as of 
September 27
th 1964, the Code had already become effective in seventeen States.
8 But the 
prospect of enactment was only much increased after New York State came round to 
adoption and, indeed, over the years, all sister states sought to follow suit. As pointed out 
in Section VI, Louisiana State had approved the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law 
(1896). The State also adopted UCC Article 3 on Commercial Papers. By contrast, the 
State  of  Louisiana  had  never  enacted  the  Uniform  Sales  Law  (1906)  and  was  not  to 
endorse UCC Article 2 on Sales either. Implementing UCC Article 2 would have meant 
doing  away  with  the  Louisiana  Civil  Code  provisions  governing  Conventional 
Obligations, of which the law of sales is part. Yet, Louisiana Civil Code Book III, Title 




                                                 
8Apart  from  Massachusetts,  these  States  were  Pennsylvania,  Kentucky,  New 
Hampshire,  Connecticut,  Rhode  Island,  Arkansas,  Wyoming,  New  Mexico,  Ohio, 
Illinois, Oklahoma, Alaska, New Jersey, Georgia, Oregon, and Michigan.   15 
IX.  Concluding Observations 
 
The federal states of the United States behaved in a fashion suggesting that economic 
interdependencies  mattered  to  some  extent  for  decisions  about  codification  of  the 
common law. Efforts aimed at reducing to writing parts of the American Common Law 
emerged  in  the  context  of  ever-increasing  economic  interdependencies  between  the 
federal states. The earliest plans to codify the Common Laws of the various American 
states  were  centered  upon  commercial  transactions  and  particularly  negotiable 
instruments  and  sales.  That  is,  the  American  states  looked  increasingly  likely  to 
invigorate drives for a codification of the common law when disparities in a particular 
area  of  the  common  law  undermined  economic  growth  by  slowing  down  interstate 
economic activity. This is a tentative conclusion because, given the available data, there 
is no way to tell with any degree of certainty when exactly codification of the common 
law became essential to facilitating the emerging economic interdependence between the 
federal states. In effect, it was not until the late nineteenth century that the federal states 
successfully unified and codified parts of the American Common Law by enacting the 
Uniform  Negotiable  Instruments  Law  (1896)  and  the  Uniform  Sales  Law  (1906),  for 
example.  Both  Uniform  Laws  largely  resembled  the  (British)  Bills  of  Exchange Act 
(1882) and Sale of Goods Act (1893) respectively. 
  On the other hand, the State of New York applied great leverage over the drafting 
process of the Uniform Commercial Code (1958). In consequence, the legal rules laid 
down  in  Uniform  Commercial  Code  (1958)  Article  2  on  Sales  and  Article  3  on 
Commercial Papers, that were submitted to replace the Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Law  (1896)  and  the  Uniform  Sales  Law  (1906),  bore  less  resemblance  to  British 
commercial law. This, in turn, is to suggest that, as the United States  had decisively 
dethroned  Britain  as  the  world’s  economic  leader  after  the  Second  World  War,  the 
American states could better afford to mold their commercial law in more uniform ways 
grounded in their own legal practice rather than British legal practice. That is, after the 
Second World War, in enacting a uniform commercial law composed along British lines, 
the American states could not have propelled their own economic growth by advancing   16 
economic activity with Britain so much as before the First World War. Again, this is a 
tentative conclusion because, given the available data, a change in economic activity of 
the American states with Britain upon enactment of a uniform commercial law composed 
along British lines is not susceptible to measurement. Then, the suggestion with which 
the paper ends is that, although the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896) and the 
Uniform Sales Law (1906) copied British examples, this is not automatically to imply 
that  the American  states,  at  the  time,  preferred  British  commercial  law  to  any  other 
commercial law. Rather, Britain’s economic leverage with the United States, which was 
to last until the First World War, must to some extent have influenced the drafters of the 
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